The short and long term price performance of initial public offerings in Istanbul Stock Exchange by Karakaya, Sevengul
i lÉ ·< Ι0·' яг ·«»' 'ѴМІ^ ’ m· ■»
m f '
P'. .4 - ¿ ‘1
P r iñ : ! «
:vt M «' 'ΐίί*>' «< *'İİİM ЙГ Ú  4 ^ ' λ  «I г  Ц S^İ^ ’ «* ·· ''^  « it ^  '<£^  >Î^ ¿  Ш ¿  ѵ^'Д' u
'«i i¿’i Í ' ■ - » i * » '  4» ·«. ■'іЗу  длІ,'— w'üaú* чі'«·»' »  »'¿А· ÍAÍV і»
К і т '  ^ '«qSU' -tjÿ «s Tİ «Nf'í'*  Íí» ''íi··' äi u- >ïW. ii  U. ¡ ¡ ^
THE SHORT AND LONG TERM 
PRICE PERFORMANCE 
OF INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 
IN ISTANBUL STOCK EXCHANGE
A THESIS
Submitted to the Faculty o f Management
and the Graduate School o f Business Administration
o f Bilkent University 
in Partial Fulfillment o f the Requirements 
For the Degree of
Master o f Business Administration
Sevengul Karayaka 
June, 1998
не
' J 8 S
i 3 es
[ '^'53831
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and 
quality, as a thesis for the degree o f Master o f Business Administration.
Assoc. Prof Kursat Aydogan
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and 
quality, as a thesis for the degree o f Master o f Business Administration.
Assoc. Prof Gulnur Muradoglu
I certify that I have read this thesis and in my opinion it is folly adequate, in scope and 
quality, as a thesis for the degree o f Master o f Business Administration.
Assistant Prof Aslihan Salih
4 ^ .
Approved for the Graduate School o f Business Administration.
THE SHORT AND LONG TERM PRICE PERFORMANCE OF INITIAL PUBLIC 
OFFERINGS IN ISTANBUL STOCK EXCHANGE
SEVENGUL KARA YAKA 
M.B.A THESIS
Supervisor; Assoc. Prof. Kursat Aydogan
The present study aims at investigating the price performance of IPO’s in the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) during the 1990-95 period in the short term and long 
term. The study is also devoted to the procedures for an Initial Public Offerings 
(IPO) and the existing regulatory environment. The existence of significant abnormal 
positive returns of new issues on the first day of trading is the proof of underpricing 
hence investors taking a position in IPO’s during the offering date can enjoy short 
term return relative to the market. However, on the average, cumulative abnormal 
returns do not exhibit any significant long term anomaly measured over 750 trading 
days.
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ÖZET
İSTANBUL MENKUL KIYMETLER BORSA’SINDA HALKA AÇILAN ŞİRKETLERİN 
KISA VE UZUN DÖNEMDE FİYAT PERFORMANSLARI
SEVENGÜL KARAYAKA 
M.B.A TEZİ
Tez Yöneticisi: Doç. Dr. Kürşat Aydoğan
Bu çalışmanın amacı, 1990-95 yılları arasında İstanbul Menkul Kıymetler 
Borsa’sında (İMKB) halka açılan şirketlerin kısa ve uzun dönemde fiyat 
davranışlarını incelemektir. Ayrıca halka arz prosedürleri ve mevcut yasal 
düzenlemeler de bu çalışmada incelenmiştir. Yeni hisse senetlerinin ilk işlem 
günündeki normalin üzerindeki pozitif getirilerinin varlığı düşük fiyatlandırmanın 
kanıtıdır. Böylece, halka arz sırasında pozisyon alan yatırımcılar ilk gün piyasaya 
göre daha yüksek getiriler elde ederler. Fakat, 750 günlük birikmiş getirileri 
incelediğinde herhangi bir normalin üzerinde getiriye rastlanmamıştır.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Halka açılan şirketler, düşük fiyatlandırma
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I.INTRODUCTION
The underpricing of initial public offerings are well documented aspect in finance 
literature and several empirical studies examining the price behavior of Initial Public 
Offerings (IPO’s) have been done over the past three decades. Early IPO studies 
primarily describe and develop the price behavior of new issue’s without analyzing 
the reason of pattern of IPO’s performance. The anomalies found by early empirical 
studies are not easily explainable using the existing theories at that time. These 
early findings stimulated the writing of theoretical papers attempting to explain the 
reasons of underpricing of IPO’s and to test the models empirically.
The empirical evidence accumulated during recent years for almost every capital 
market in the world indicates that IPO’s provide significant abnormal returns on their 
first day of trading. While there is a considerable debate concerning the underlying 
rationale of such returns, the literature is almost unanimous its conclusion that their 
presence constitutes evidence of deliberate underpricing. In addition to the short run 
underpricing phenomenon, numerous studies have documented another anomaly 
that significant short-term returns often evaporate over time. Moreover, modern 
theories of IPO pricing offer various explanations for underpricing and these 
explanations arise from important informational asymmetries betw'een market 
participants.
By far, the empirical studies in literature covered the short-run and long-run 
performance of IPO’s, the reasons of the underpricing of new issues, underwriter 
price support, underwriter reputation and its impact on the pricing of new issues, the 
choice of the offering method in IPO’s and the firm value.
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In the light of the available finance literature, the present empirical study insights 
into underpricing mystery of IPO’s but does not solve it. The present study aims at 
investigating the return characteristics of IPO’s in the Turkish Stock Market in the 
short term and long term. One objective is to measure the initial performance in the 
first day following the offer. Furthermore, IPO’s performance in the secondary 
market is observed. Accordingly, the present study focuses on determining the 
short-term and long-term anomalies of IPO’s in Istanbul Stock Exchange (ISE) in the 
days and years following the offer.
In the short term, underpricing of IPO’s of common stock are investigated and we 
determine whether the new issues are underpriced or overpriced. In the longer term 
the speed of market adjustment to mispricing is analyzed. Such anomalies are 
inconsistent with efficient markets and with effective information processing by 
undenfl/riters and buyers of new issues. If such anomalies were the sign of 
inefficiency, we would expect stronger anomalies in this study since the Turkish 
market is not efficient.
On the other hand, the documented studies in finance literature are generally 
conducted on the institutional and legal framework of developed capital markets, 
mostly US. The pricing behavior of IPO’s in an emerging market with different 
institutional arrangements can be different from its pattern in developed markets. 
Hence, our empirical study also provides an opportunity to decide whether or not 
institutional and legal framework are responsible for the behavior of IPO’s.
We examine the daily abnormal returns of 87 IPO’s in the Turkish Stock Market 
during the period 1990-95. Results indicate that they are generally underpriced on 
the first day of trading. However, on the average, cumulative abnormal returns do
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not exhibit any significant long term anomaly measured over 750 trading days. The 
only significant anomaly found in that part of the study was the first day abnormal 
return.
Furthermore, IPO’s are grouped according to the types of companies including 
private versus public, the year of issuance, the offering method and the percentage 
of the shares offered to the public in order to determine the underlying reasons for 
abnormal returns. Though some segmentation used in this study exhibit a relation 
with the underpricing and the performance of IPO’s, the results suggest that 
institutional and legal arrangements are more likely to explain such phenomenon.
The paper is organized as follows. The following chapter presents the definition of 
IPO and the recent developments In the ISE. Chapter 3 is devoted to review the 
procedures required for a company to be taken public and the role assumed in this 
process by the intermediary financial Institution. The documented studies in finance 
literature is presented in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, data and methodology of the 
present study are discussed. The results of the study and concluding comments 
constitute Chapter 6 and the last chapter respectively.
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The first public equity issue that is made by a company is referred to as an initial 
public offering (IPO). The main driving factor behind the companies’ decision to go 
public is to strengthen financial base and to be protected from undesired economic 
conditions. When growth can no longer be financed internally or through borrowing, 
the companies will consider a public offering. The company aims to obtain 
additional funds through public offerings for the new investments, increasing 
business volume and paying down debt. The equity capital generated by an IPO 
improves the debt-equity ratio and enhances the company’s cash position. Thus, 
companies provide a feasible and rational combination of debt and equity .
Financial Liberalization during 1980's have promoted the development capital 
markets in Turkey. Development of equity markets have been taken into 
consideration in the process of promoting capital markets. Increasing interest for 
equity markets gave rise to an improvement in the primary markets. Hence it leads 
to the increasing tendency of the corporations to make new issue public offerings 
as well as issue offerings of existing shares.
The Istanbul Stock Exchange was established in 1985. Public offerings of common 
stock were largely introduced in 1990 and continued upto now. During the period of 
1986-1997, the market capitalization of the ISE grew from US$ 938 million to US$ 
61 billion, nearly 65-fold in US$ terms. The increase in trade volume was even more 
striking. Between 1986-1997, the annual trade volume rose from US$ 13 million to 
US$ 58 billion, a 4.5 thousand-fold increase. As seen in Table 1, the average daily 
trade volume in 1997 was US$ 229 million, representing a 50% increase compared 
to the previous year.
II. INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING AND ISTANBUL STOCK EXCHANGE
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Table 1; The Quoted Companies in the ISE during the 1991-1997 period
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Number of Quoted Companies 134 145 160 176 205 228 258
Number of Companies Added 24 13 17 25 30 25 31
Number of Companies 
Delisted
- 2 2 9 1 2 1
Market Cap. (US$ mn.) 19,000 12,300 37,000 21,785 20,782 30,797 61,371
Average Daily Vol.(US$ mn.) 35 35 88 92 209 153 229
ISE Index 44* 40* 207* 273* 400* 976* 3,451
P/E (period-end) 15.9 11.4 25.7 24.8 9.2 12.2 15.7
‘Adjusted for the dropping of two digits from the index in 1997
As of 31 December 1997, the number of companies listed on the ISE reached 258, 
up from 80 companies in 1986. As seen in Table 1, in 1997, 31 companies went 
public compared to 25 in 1996. In 1996, due to an unfavorable economic and 
political climate, the number of IPO’s could not surpass that in 1995 and 1997. 
Moreover, a significant number of IPO’s is in the pipeline for 1998 if an unfavorable 
economic and political climate does not exist during the 1998 period.
The highest market P/E ratio at the Istanbul Stock Exchange was recorded in 
August 1990 with 30.7, just before the Gulf Crisis. As of December 31, 1997, the 
average market P/E was 15.7 based on ‘97 year-end profits.
The Capital Markets Law has several clauses forbidding insider trading, price 
manipulation, self-dealing, and non-reporting of material corporate events. The 
regulation of the equity market is the duty of the Capital Markets Board, a state 
agency, which has the authority to issue circulars regarding interpretation of the 
relevant clauses of the Capital Markets Law, and to penalize and suspend members 
and listed companies for violations of rules.
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The purpose of the section is to review the procedures required for a company to be 
taken public and for its shares to be traded on the Istanbul Stock Exchange and the 
role assumed in this process by the intermediary financial institution. The public 
offering of a company's equity should be thought of in a broad sense. The relevant 
regulatory framework as well as all activities related to the written and oral 
solicitation of investors should be viewed as part of the public offering process.
III. I Initiation of the Public Offering Process, Valuation of Company’s Shares, 
and Strategy Formulation
The process is initiated by the company's decision to go public. The company then 
contacts an "investment banker" in order to discuss the timing and conditions of the 
offering. If an agreement is reached between the two parties, an "underwriting 
agreement" is signed.
III.I.1 Valuation Report
The intermediary institution prepares a valuation report which estimates the value of 
the company's shares. The content of the valuation report is prescribed in detail by 
the Capital Market Board ("CMB"). The scope of the report is held broad and 
features the following main items.
• General structure of the firm and description of the firm's activities (capital 
structure, production, sales, organization, personnel, facilities, participation’s, 
etc.)
• Sector review (cost structure, pricing, competition, local and export markets, 
significant developments in the sector, etc.)
III. PROCEDURES FOR AN INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING IN TURKEY
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• Analysis and projection of demand for the sector and for the company (going 
forward 5 to 10 years)
• Financial analysis of the firm (review of historical financial statements, financial 
ratios, comparison with sector)
• Projection of financial statements (forecast of balance sheet and income 
statement over the next 5 to 10 years)
• Valuation: the fair value of the company's shares is determined in this section 
based on the discounted cash flow method and on trading multiples. To the 
extent possible, prices of similar companies trading on the Stock Exchange are 
used as a basis for the valuation, in order to reflect current market conditions.
111.1.2 Pricing
This is one of the most important factors that the company must focus on in an initial 
public offering. While it is difficult for a "good" price to enable the sale of a "bad" 
firm, it is often the case that a "bad" price disables the sale of a "good" firm. A firm 
may have various objectives in going public in addition to that of simply maximizing 
the proceeds of the equity sale. Such objectives may include enhancing prestige, 
spreading risk, and establishing liquidity in the company's shares.
111.1.3 Timing
The success of a public offering is significantly affected by the timing of the sale. It 
is difficult for the offering to succeed when trading volume in the market has shrunk. 
The regulations governing the process of a public offering allow some flexibility with 
regards to the timing of the sale. For example, if market conditions are not favorable 
at the time at which the shares are registered with the Capital Market Board, the 
sale may be delayed for a reasonable time period.
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111.1.3 strategy Formulation
Prior to being traded in the secondary market, the shares must be offered for sale 
either at appropriate outlets or directly at the primary market of the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange. Depending on the offering price and on the conditions prevailing in the 
market, the intermediary financial institution will make a suggestion as to which 
alternative should be preferred.
111.1.4 The "Underwriting" versus "Best Efforts" Alternatives
Until recently, the role of the intermediary institution in a public offering was limited 
to selling the shares being offered on a best efforts basis.
According to Capital Market Board Decree (Series I, No.22), however, the 
intermediary institution is required to underwrite the shares being offered if the IPO 
takes place through the sale of the existing shares of the current owners or the sale 
of shares newly issued through a capital increase (not only if the company is in the 
registered capital system). The underwriting of shares by the intermediary institution 
means that it commits to selling the shares being underwritten and to buy those 
shares it is unable to sell at the agreed price.
In the "best efforts" alternative, the intermediary institution collects a sales 
commission on those shares that it is able to sell and returns the rest of the shares. 
In the "underwriting" alternative, the intermediary institution earns an underwriting 
commission on those shares which it commits to sell in addition to the sales 
commission.
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111.11. Alternative Methods Employed in a Public Offering
A company that wishes to go public can employ one of two alternative methods. The 
first method is for the present owners to sell their existing shares. The second 
method is for the company to increase its nominal capital and to subsequently sell 
the newly issued shares to the public.
111.11. 1 Offering Through Sale of Existing Shares
The following conditions are required for the company to carry out its IPO through 
this method.
1. The nominal value of the shares to be issued must be no less than
-15% of the total nominal equity capital of the firm for companies with total 
nominal equity capital less than 250 billion TL,
-10% of the total nominal equity capital of the firm for companies with total 
nominal equity capital between 250 billion TL and 500 billion TL,
-5% of the total nominal equity capital of the firm for companies with total 
nominal equity capital more than 500 billion TL,
2. If the shares being issued belong to a certain group or tranche, then all of the 
shares pertaining to that group or tranche must be paid in. Otherwise, the entire 
equity capital of the firm must be paid in.
3. The transfer and circulation of the shares being issued must not be subject to 
any restrictions, such as their being held as collateral to financial obligations.
4. The physical certificates pertaining to the shares must be printed in compliance 
with the requirements mandated by the Capital Market Board Decree Series I, 
No. 5.
IPO’s in ISE
Public offerings of this kind are regulated by the Capital Market Board Decree 
Series I, No. 22.
III.II. 2 Offering Through Sale of Newly Issued Capital
In this method, the company increases its nominal capital and the shareholders 
forego their preemptive rights arising from this capital increase. The newly issued 
shares, which are not claimed by the existing shareholders, are then offered to the 
public.
Since this method ensures that the proceeds of the offering flow directly to the 
company, it enhances the capital structure of the firm. From an accounting 
standpoint, that part of the proceeds which corresponds to the nominal value of the 
shares being issued is added to the paid-in capital. The remaining part of the 
proceeds, corresponding to the difference between the sale price and the nominal 
price of the shares being issued, is added to shareholder equity in the "capital 
surplus" account and may be subsequently distributed to shareholders through the 
distribution of bonus shares (effectively a stock-split).
For a public offering to be carried out through this method, the company can 
operate under the "registered capital" or “regular capital” system. Under the 
registered capital system, a company may increase its equity capital without being 
subject to the requirements of the Turkish Trade Law, provided that the capital 
remains less than or equal to the company's "registered capital ceiling." This allows 
the physical certificates to be printed prior to the selling process. The ISE requires 
that only the physical certificates are traded. A company that operates under the 
registered capital system can have the physical certificates printed before the IPO,
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hence the shares of the company can start trading earlier compared to one which 
does not operate under the registered capital system. The requirements for 
operating under the registered capital system are given by the CMB Decree Series I, 
No.22.
Ill.lll. Application to the Capital Market Board
The application to the CMB is carried out by the intermediary institution if the 
offering is to take place through the sale of existing shares and by the company 
itself if the offering is to take place through the issuance of new equity capital.
The CMB reviews and reaches a decision on the application within 30 days, 
excluding the time required for the company to provide any information that may be 
missing in the application or additionally required by the Board. If the application is 
accepted, the shares are registered with the CMB. In reviewing the application, the 
CMB examines whether the offering circular and the sample physical certificates are 
in compliance with relevant regulations.
III.IV Registration Of Shares with the Capital Market
III.IV.1 Registration with the CMB
For the shares to be registered with the CMB, a registration fee in the amount of 0.2 
% of the total amount (total number of issued shares times issue price) must be 
deposited at the CMB's account with the Central Bank of Turkey.
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Within 15 days after the registration of the shares with the CMB, the filing 
memorandum ("izahname" in Turkish) approved by the CMB must be registered at 
the Commercial Registry and published in the Commercial Register Newspaper.
III.IV.3 Offering Circular
For public offerings, the "offering circular" must be announced in at least two 
nationwide newspapers within 1 week after the publication of the filing 
memorandum.
III.IV.4 Collection of Bids
The period allocated for the collection of bids starts at least 3 days and at most 5 
days after the announcement of the offering circular. The period lasts at least 2 
business days.
III.IV.5 Regulations Pertaining to Promotion and Advertising
All promotion and advertising materials relating to the offering must be submitted to 
the review of the CMB at least 2 days before their publishing or broadcast. (This is 
regulated by the CMB Decree Series VIII, No. 22.)
III.IV.2 Filing Memorandum
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Regulations pertaining to the methods of sale that may be employed in a public 
offering have been reconstituted by the CMB and published in the Official Gazette 
on October 27, 1993.
Accordingly, non-public firms may offer their shares to the public through one of the 
following two methods of sale.
1. Collection of bids
2. Sale through the Stock Exchange
III.V. 1. Collection Of Bids
The collection of bids may be conducted either through a "fixed-price offering" or 
through the "book building" method.
III.V. 1.1 Fixed-Price Offering
If public offerings carried out through this method of sale, a fixed share price is 
determined. Investors fill in and sign the bid forms and submit them to the 
intermediary institution during the period designated in the offering circular. When 
the bid form is submitted, the investor must deposit the amount corresponding to the 
shares to the designated account in the intermediary institution.
At the end of the bid collection period, the allocation of shares among investors is 
carried out in the following manner.
III.V. Methods Of Sale
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The total amount of shares to be offered is divided by the number of investors and 
the request of each investor up to the resulting amount is met. The remaining 
amount of shares is then divided by the number of investors whose requests have 
not yet been fully met. This allocation process is continued until the entire amount of 
shares has been allocated. The allocation of each investor is then reviewed in light 
of his/her minimum requirement and those allocations that fall short of the investor's 
minimum requirement are removed from the list. The shares removed from the 
allocation are reallocated through the same procedure described above.
III.V. 1. 2 Book Building Method
A minimum price is determined for the shares and bids above this minimum price 
are collected. As in the fixed price method, investors submit the bid forms and 
deposit the corresponding amount at the intermediary institution.
At the end of the bid collection period, the allocation of shares is conducted as 
follows.
Starting from the highest-price bid, the bids are transformed into a table showing 
cumulative bid amounts at each price level. The price level at which the cumulative 
amount exceeds the amount of shares offered is fixed as the selling price. All bids 
above that price are met. The remaining shares are allocated among the bids at the 
level of the fixed price proportionally with the amount of such bids.
In either bid collection scheme, the intermediary institutions submit to the company 
going public a list of the allocation of shares among investors within two business 
days after the end of the bid collection period.
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The company then approves the allocation list and returns it to the intermediary 
institution within two business days. The list of bids that are not met are announced 
by the branches of the intermediary institution and the corresponding amounts are 
returned immediately to investors. Also, the shares pertaining to bids that have been 
met are released to investors.
III.V. 2. Sale Through The Stock Exchange
The public offering of capital markets instruments may be carried out on the Stock 
Exchange within the regulatory framework of the ISE following approval by the 
CMB. The sale can be made through the Exchange by applying to the ISE along 
with the required documents at least 20 days prior to the offering. The Board of 
Directors of the ISE must then approve and announce the offering.
The sale is conducted in the primary market of the ISE single-handedly by a 
designated intermediary institution. Those investors who buy the shares in the 
primary market must wait until the shares trade in the secondary market in order to 
sell their shares. The price designated at the time of registration with the CMB is set 
as the opening price. From then on, the price of the shares moves within the band 
determined by the daily limits set by the ISE.
III.VI. Application for Listing and Trading on the ISE
The ISE board of Directors meets once a week on Tuesdays. The application file 
must be filed with the ISE administration at least one week prior to the Board of 
Directors (BOD) meeting for the application to be considered. Provided that these
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requirements are satisfied, a decision regarding listing and trading in an 
unseasoned equity will be made by the BOD in the first week after the passage of 2 
days pursuant the filing of the application.
III.VII. ISE Disclosure Requirements
Companies, the equity shares of which are traded on the ISE, must prepare annual 
financial statements, have these audited by authorized independent auditors and 
announce the results publicly. The disclosure requirement ought to be kept in mind 
carefully in the decision to go public.
III.VIII. Timing
The significant stages in the process of taking a company public and the 
approximate time needed to complete these stages is given below. The entire 
process takes approximately two-and-a half months.
Table 2: The Approximate Time Needed to Complete the Stages of IPO Process
1 Valuation, Preliminary Research, etc.
2 CMB Approval
3 Listing on the ISE
25-30 days 
30-45 days 
2 days
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IV.LITERATURE SURVEY
The underpricing of initial public offerings are well documented aspect in finance 
literature and several empirical studies examining the price behavior of IPO’s have 
been done over the past three decades as seen in tables below. Early IPO studies 
primarily describe and develop the price behavior of new issue’s without analyzing 
the reason of pattern of IPO’s performance. Because the anomalies found by early 
empirical studies are a puzzle which are not easily explainable using theories at that 
time. The most striking empirical findings obtained by early IPO studies is a 
consistent pattern of excess returns on the first day of trading which evaporate over 
time. Parallel with the development in modern theories, these early findings 
stimulated the writing of theoretical papers attempting to explain the reasons of 
underpricing of new issues and to test the models empirically.
Table 3: The Summary of Empirical Studies About IPO’s Reported Short and Long 
term Anomalies
I Publication Authors Size Period Type Return % S/L*
1969 Reilly&Hatfield 759 78-85 Firm Commitment 18.3-20.2 S,L
1970 Stoll&Curley 205 57,59,63 Not Specified 42.4-75 S,L
1972 McDonald&Fisher 142 69-70 Not Specified 28.5 S
1973 Reilly 53 63-65 Not Specified 9.9-43.7 S,L
1973 Logue 250 65-69 Firm Commitment 20.8-52.1 N.S
1974 Mcdonald&Jacquillat 31 68-71 Not Specified 3 S
1974 Neuberger&Hammond 816 65-69 Not Specified 17 S,L
1975 Ibbotson&Jaffe 128 60-70 Not Specified 16.8 S
1975 Ibbotson 120 60-69 Not Specified 11.4 S
1975 Bear&Curley 140 1969 Not Specified 9.5 S,L
1977 Reilly 553 72-75 Not Specified 10.8 S,L
1980 Black&Stanley 102 74-78 Not Specified 5.96 S,L
1981 Buckland 297 65-75 Not Specified 27 S
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Publication Authors
1983 Neuberger&LaChapell 118 75-80
1983 Peavy 41 85-87
1984 Ritter 1028 77-82
1987 Chalk&Peavy 649 75-82
1987 Jog&Riding 100 71-83
1987 Miller&Reilly 510 82-83
1988 Balvers 1182 81-85
1988 Johnson&Miller 502 81-83
1988 Tinic 204 23-71
1988 Ibbotson,Sindelar,Ritter 8,668 60-87
1989 Muscarella& Vetsuypen 38 70-87
1989 Koh&Walter 66 73-87
1989 Anderson&Born 35 86-87
1989 Weiss 64 85-87
1990 Aggarwal&Rivoli 1598 77-87
1990 Carter&Manasters 501 79-83
1991 Aggarwal&Rivoli 1556-196 77-87
1991 Anderson&Beard 43 70-87
1991 Megginson&Weiss 640 83-87
1991 Ritter 1526 75-84
1992 Anderson&Born 30 86-89
1992 ChO 717 75-84
1992 Manuer&Senbet 1002 77-84
1993 Drake&Vetsuypens 93 69-90
1993 Levis 712 80-88
1993 Barry&Jennings 229 88-90
993 Aggarwal,Leal, Hernandez 142 80-90
1993 Affleck-Graves 1127 83-87
Return %
Not Specified 8.3-73.5 S,L
Firm Commitment Neg S,L
Not Specified 16.3-48.4 S
Best Effort 19.6-37.8 S,L
Not Specified 9-11.5 S
Not Specified 9.9 S
Firm Commitment 7.84 S
Firm Commitment 11.2-14 S
Not Specified 14.3-17 S,L
Not Specified 16.4 S
Best Effort 7.12 S
Not Specified 11.2-14 S
Firm Commitment Neg S,L
Firm Commitment 0 S,L
Firm Commitment 10.7 S,L
Firm Commitment 13.1-19.6 S,L
F.C&B.E 9.9-51.7 S
Firm Commitment Neg S,L
Firm Commitment 7.1-11.9 S
Not Specified 14.3-17 S,L
Firm Commitment Neg S,L
Best Effort 42.3 S
Firm Commitment 18.9 S
Not Specified 9.18 S,L
F.C&B.E 14.3 S,L
Firm Commitment 6.1 S
Not Specified 2.8-78.5 S,L
Firm Commitment 4.8-10.4 S
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*: S: The studies cover the short-run performance of IPO’s 
L: The studies cover the long-run performance of IPO’s
By far. the empirical studies in literature covered the short-run and long-run 
performance of IPO’s, the reasons of the underpricing of new issues, unden/vriter 
price support, underwriter reputation and its impact on the pricing of new issues, the 
choice of the offering method in IPO’s and the firm value.
In this chapter, we present a brief summary of the most relevant research for the 
present empirical study. First, we summarize descriptive studies and describe their 
initial conclusions. Then, we summarize and analyze various economic models 
offered to explain IPO pricing behavior.
The most relevant research for the present empirical study is the research done by 
Aydogan (1993). The study is examined the performance of initial public offerings in 
the Turkish market. The examination of IPO’s during 1990-91 in the Turkish market 
showed that, on the average, IPO’s were not underpriced and any significant pattern 
in the long term in a way that better or worse than the average stock in the market 
was not observed.
Many empirical studies built on the framework of developed capital markets 
document positive initial returns and negative long-run returns such as 
Aggarwal&Rivoli (1990), Ritter (1991), Levis(1993), Aggarwal, Lealand and 
Hernadez(1993).
Aggarwal and Rivoli (1990) employ a sample of 1598 offerings over the 1977- 1987 
period to investigate whether the price behavior of IPO’s is consistent with the 
presence of fads. They find that early abnormal returns are significantly positive, but
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that prices decline significantly in the year following the initial offering. The 
phenomenon holds in groupings based on size, offering price, year and underwriter 
class. They conclude that their findings are supportive of IPO’s being subject to 
overvaluation or fads in early aftermarket trading.
Ritter (1991) employs a sample of 1526 IPO’s in 1975-1984. Using a 36 month time 
frame, he reports that IPO’s, on average, exhibit positive returns during the first two 
months, but returns become negative in the months that follow. Ritter has shown 
that in the long run, unseasoned issues performed well below average. Three years 
after initial offering, average return of IPO’s was only half of a matched sample of 
other stocks
Levis (1993) utilizes 712 IPO’s in the United Kingdom over the 1980-1988 period. 
He reports an average first-day return of 14.3%. The study also shows that these 
IPO’s underperform other benchmarks in the three years following the initial public 
offering.
Aggarwal, Leal and Hernandez (1993) examine a total of 142 IPO’s in Brazil, Chile 
and Mexico over the 1980-1990 period. The empirical study reports short-term 
returns of 78.5%, 16.7% and 2.8% respectively. Long-run returns are reported to be 
negative which is consistent with long-run IPO price behavior in the United States.
The empirical analyses summarized above point to several well-established facts 
about the characteristics of initial public offerings of stocks in the U.S and other 
countries. While some of these facts are unsurprising, several features of IPO 
performance require some explanation.
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The literature abounds with a variety of situations that explains the observed 
underpricing in the initial public offering of common stock. However, with only a few 
exceptions, many of these theories can be rejected from certain points. They either 
lack a sound theoretical foundation or refuted by the evidence.
Developments in game theory, financial economics and information theory all 
contributed to the theoretical analyses of IPO’s observed since the early 1980s. The 
modern approach pays great attention to describing the informational environment 
in which economic actors make transactions. Since an IPO involves four relevant 
groups of actors: The issuing firm, the underwriting/distribution syndicate, the initial 
buyers and the larger set of investors in the secondary market. The information 
known to these various groups is critical.
Although agents can have different information without any agent having 
unambiguously superior information, most models of IPO pricing typically assume 
one group has superior information on the firm value. Other agents know this and 
behave accordingly. The most widely discussed theories of underpricing of IPO 
differ in their assumptions about which actors have superior information.
Perhaps the best known and most studied explanation of IPO underpricing is the 
adverse selection mechanism first proposed by Rock(1986), and analyzed by 
Beatty and Ritter(1986), Carter and Mananster(1990), Koh and Walter(1989), and 
Mcstay(1992).
Rock(1986) developed a theoretically consistent model of underpricing based on 
two primary assumptions: potential investors are differentially informed about the 
value of the issue and the issuing firm/underwriter does not have useful private
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information on the issuing firm’s prospects. In this formulation, the existence of 
investors with superior information about the issue value places uninformed 
investors at a disadvantage. Uninformed investors face competition for good shares, 
but have a higher probability of obtaining bad shares due to the rationing 
mechanism applied to oversubscribed offerings. To induce the uninformed to 
participate in the IPO markets, shares must be underpriced on average.
Beatty and Ritter (1986) extend the model to show that the value of information and 
the bias against uninformed investors and the necessary underpricing are higher for 
issues for which there is greater uncertainty about their value.
Alternately, Baron (1982) applies principal-agent analysis to the IPO underpricing 
paradox. Unlike Rock’s model(1986), Baron(1982) assumes that the investment 
banker/underwriter has information superior to that of the firm. The underwriter has 
valuable, private information on market demand. The issuer will wish to learn this 
information, yet must offer an incentive to the underwriter to truthfully reveal it.
Further, the success of the offer depends not just on market conditions, but also on 
underwriter effort which may itself be unobserved by the issuer. In order to secure 
truthful private information and encourage promotion efforts, the issuer may agree 
to a contract that leads to underpricing.
In addition, the other well-known explanation for underpricing of unseasoned equity 
is relied on market power of investments bankers (Ritter(1984)). Ritter proposes that 
investment bankers underprice new common stocks on purpose to reduce their risks 
and cost of underwriting. Monopsony-Power Hypothesis, proposed by Ritter(1984), 
is that gross underpricing may be a result of the monopsony power of the
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investment bankers in underwriting of common stocks of small speculative firms. 
Large and reputable investment bankers generaliy do not accept to underwrite 
common stocks of small and speculative firms. The IPO’s of small firms are 
underwritten by investment bankers who can exercise greater bargaining power 
over the issuers. These investment bankers intentionally underprice the securities 
and ration them to their large customers who regularly buy a variety of investment 
services from them.
Unlike the assumptions made by adverse selection modeis and principal-agent 
theories of underpricing, signaling models assume that the issuer has better 
information on security vaiue than do the undenvriters or investors. The well-known 
studies attempting to provide some explanations for the price behavior of IPO’s 
relied on the signaling models are Grinblatt and Hwang(1989), Welch (1989) and 
Cho(1992).
The signaling models predict that issuing firms try to signal positive information to 
the investor by underpricing IPO’s. Welch(1989) report that firms underprice their 
initial public offerings of equity so that they can subsequently issue seasoned equity 
at more favorable prices. A positive relation is found between underpricing of IPO’s 
and the probability and the size of subsequent seasoned offerings. Issuers retrieve 
the money they give away by benefiting from higher prices in a later, seasoned 
offering of additional shares.
Cho (1992) tests the signaling model of Welch in explaining best efforts IPO 
offerings, incorporating the possibility of failure. He concludes that the optimal offer 
price is determined by considering the trade-off between underpricing and the 
probability of failure.
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V. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
V.l DATA
Data file contains daily closing bid prices of securities trading in ISE and ISE-100 
indices for each day for about 750 trading days. Daily ending bid prices of securities 
are adjusted for the capital increases that might have occurred in the studied time 
periods. Furthermore, offering prices, type of offerings, the date of first day of 
trading, the types of companies and the percentage of offering, the issue size are 
also included in data file. The data used in this study was obtained from ‘Istanbul 
Stock Exchange’ and ‘Capital Market Boards’. However, due to limited availability of 
follow up data and some misleading data for the public offerings, the sample used in 
this study covers just 87 initial public offerings during the period 1990-1995 instead 
of all IPO’s realized during the same period. Further information about the 
companies in the sample can be seen in Appendix.
As mentioned before, the aim of the study isto analyze the return characteristics of 
IPO’s in ISE and to determine whether the new issues are underpriced or 
overpriced. Furthermore, the study concentrates on determining whether short-term 
returns evaporate over time and Initial Public Offerings would be outperformed or 
underperformed the market in the longer term.
Table 4; The Summary of IPO’s in the Sample
All IPO’s Sample Private Public
1990 35 17 14 3
1991 24 14 6 8
1992 13 8 8 -
1993 17 9 9 -
1994 25 19 19 -
1995 30 20 20 -
Total 144 87 76 11
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The sample in 1990 contained 17 IPO’s managed by 13 different leader 
intermediaries. Of these, 3 IPO’s were public companies whose shares are offered 
through the privatization program. The size of the issues and the offering prices 
spanned a wide range. Issue size ranged from 375,000 shares to 75,000,000 
shares and from US$ 0.7 million to US$ 345 million. The shares of the companies 
offered to the public spanned from 5% to 40%. The offering prices ranged from 
2,500 TL (0.96 US$) to 29,000 TL (11.1 US$). Two firms in the sample issued their 
stocks by increasing the paid in capital and selling the new issued shares to the 
public, constraining their preemptive rights and the rest of the sample, fifteen 
companies sold the existing shares to the public.
The sample in 1991 contained 14 IPO’s, of them, 8 were state owned companies. 
The issue size spanned from US$ 1 million to US$ 52 million. The shares of the 
companies oferred to the public ranged from 2.5% to 90.9%. The offering prices 
were in the range of 1,000 TL (0.22 US$)to 270,000 TL (73.6 US$). Among 14 
IPO’s, one firm issued its stocks by increasing the paid in capital and eleven firms 
sold the existing shares to the public, one firm was sold in the Istanbul Stock 
Exchange and one firm was established as mutual fund.
The sample in 1992 contained 8 IPO’s which were offered to the public by 7 
different leader brokers. The issue size spanned from US$ 0.43 million to US$ 21.8 
million. The shares of the companies offered to the public ranged from 4% to 80%. 
The offering prices were in the range of 1,000 TL (0.14 US$) to 10,500 TL (1.4 
US$). 3 IPO’s in the sample were offered to the public by increasing the paid in 
capital, the rest sold the existing shares to the public.
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The sample in 1993 contained 9 IPO’s managed by 7 different leader 
intermediaries. Issue size ranged from US$ 3.1 million to US$ 22.1 million. The 
shares of the companies offered to the public ranged from 15% to 33%. The 
offering prices ranged from 3,900 TL (0.34 US$) to 8,250 TL (0.88 US$). Of IPO’s, 4 
IPO’s were offered to the public by increasing the paid in capital, the rest sold the 
existing shares.
The sample in 1994 contained 19 IPO’s . Of IPO’s, 5 were offered to the public by 
increasing the paid-in capital and selling the new issued shares to the public and the 
rest sold the existing shares to the public. Issue size ranged from US$ 1.9 million to 
US$ 34.8 million. The shares of the companies offered to the public ranged from 
9.3% to 38.5%. The offering prices ranged from 4,000 TL (0.11 US$) to 65,000 TL 
(2.08 US$).
The sample in 1995 contained 20 IPO’s. Issue size ranged from 241 thousand to 
US$ 42.6 million. The offering prices ranged from 2,800 TL ( 0.07 US$) to 25,500 
TL (0.60 US$). Of IPO’s in sample, 12 companies issued their stocks by increasing 
the paid in capital and selling the new issues, 7 companies sold the existing shares 
to the public.
V.ll. METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in the present study are similar to the method used by 
Aydogan (1993). Parallel with the study done by Aydogan, the returns are 
calculated for 4 intervals:
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The initial return period (normally 1 day) defined the offering date to the closing 
price at the end of first day of trading and the after market period defined as the 1, 2 
and 3 years after the IPO's exclusive of the initial return period.
The abnormal return on security i on day t (AR|,t) is defined as the difference 
between daily return Ri,, and the return on the market M,
ARj,t = Ri,t - Mf
The return on day t (R|,t) is the percentage change in prices between two 
successive days;
Rf.t -  ( Pi, t "Pi ,t-i) / Pi ,1-1
where P|,t and Pi represents closing prices adjusted for stock dividends on days t 
and t-1
ISE-100 index was selected as the proxy for the market. The return on the market 
(M t) is defined in a similar fashion as the percentage change in the levels of the ISE 
Composite Index in two successive days.
M, = (MİSE,-MİSE ,-i)/MISE,.i
If t= 0 denotes the day an initial public offering is made, the average abnormal 
return of n IPO's t days after the initial offer, AR, is given as
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A R ,=  ^  ARi,/n
1 =  1
For n securities average cumulative abnormal returns between the days ti and t2
after the initial offering , CARt is the sum of average abnormal returns over that 
period:
tl
CAR, = 2 ] AR,
(=il
The statistics for the average CAR's (t) are computed as
t=  CAR,/a (CAR,) (t= ti...t2)
Where a (CAR,) = a( AR,) * Vt2 - tl + 1
CT ( AR,) is the average variance between days t , and t 2.
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VI.RESULTS
Firstly, abnormal returns on the first day after issue is computed for each one of the 
87 IPO’s in the sample. As seen in Table 5, on the average, first day abnormal 
returns is 10.4% with a t-stat of 3.15. The highest abnormal returns in belongs to 
Adana Çimento (A,C), whose shares are sold to the public under the privatization 
program. After excluding Adana Çimento (A,C), the highest abnormal return belongs 
to Otokar which realized an abnormal return of 32.6% on the first day. Excluding 
Adana Çimento ( A,C), on the average, first day abnormal returns is 6.52% with a t- 
stat of 5.6. Of the sample, 76% is underpriced. Average first day abnormal return of 
IPO’s during the 1990-95 period is statistically different from zero. Hence we 
conclude that IPO’s in Turkish market are underpriced.
Table 5; Cumulative Abnormal Returns for IPO’s
CAR(1) CAR(5) CAR(250) CAR(500) CAR(750)
All n 10.4% 13.2% 13.5% 17.0% 17.7%
( t-stat) 87 3.15 3.6 1.6 1.4 1.1
Notes:
CAR(1), CAR(5), CAR(250): includes the IPO made between 1990-1995 period.
CAR(500): excludes the IPO’s made in 1995 due to limited availability of follow up data.
CAR(750); excludes the IPO’s made between 1994-1995 period due to limited availability of follow up 
data.
CAR Figure 1: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for IPO's
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In order to investigate the performance of IPO’s over a longer time period, 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR’s) were computed for up to 750 trading days 
(about 3 years). Average CAR’s for 5. 250, 500 and 750 days and their t statistics 
are given in Table 5. All CAR’s are positive but only one CAR for 5 days is 
statistically significant. Though the results are not statistically significant, the positive 
cumulative abnormal returns denote that short term return of new issues does not 
evaporate over time as shown in Figure 1. Whereas, considering the results of the 
tests for medium and long term price behavior, it can be concluded that cumulative 
abnormal returns do not exhibit any long term anomaly. The only anomaly found in 
that part of the study is the underpricing of the new issues on the first day of the 
trading.
Table 6: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Private and Public Companies
n CAR(1) CAR(5) CAR(250) CAR(500) CAR(750)
Private 76 6.4% 9.6% 2.1% 3.4% 0.5%
( t-stat) 5.3 4.7 0.3 0.3 0.0
Public 11 38.5% 37.8% 92.1% 108.8% 127.8%
( t-stat) 1.6 1.6 2.6 2.6 2.5
Public* 9 7.9% 8.7% 65.6% 83.6% 111.9%
( t-stat) 1.9 1.3 2.3 2.2 2.2
Public*: After excluding Adana (A,C )
We also investigated the impact of the type of companies on the underpricing of 
new issues through grouping the companies in the sample in terms of private issues 
versus public companies whose shares were offered through the privatization 
program. The average underpricing of the privatization companies is 38.5%, 
whereas private issues are underpriced by 6.4% on the average, as seen in Table 
6. Though the result for private issues is statistically significant, the result for public 
issues is not statistically significant. On the other hand, after excluding Adana (A,C),
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the privazation issues are underpriced by 7.9% though the result is not statistically 
significant.
Figure 2: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for IPO's
I All O  Private ■  Public
As far as the long term performance is concerned, as seen in Figure 3, state owned 
companies obtain statistically significant abnormal return of 127.8%, however 
private owned companies have cumulative abnormal return of 0.5% which is not 
statistically significant. Furthermore, after excluding Adana(A,C), the state owned 
companies still obtain statistically significant abnormal return of 111.9%.
Public Participation’s Administration (PPA), the governmental agency engaged in 
privatization is known to act as a market maker for stocks in its portfolio. PPA 
generally support IPO’s after issue due to its concern for the next public offering in 
the privatization program. The case may help explain why long run performance of 
the IPO’s of state owned companies are better than the IPO’s of private companies 
as shown in Figure 2. For instance, especially during the economic crisis in 1994, 
PPA acted as a market maker for the state owned companies. Moreover, the 
speculations about the further privazation programs have resulted the significant 
cumulative abnormal returns for the state owned companies.
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Figure 3: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for IPO's Grouped 
According to the Private versus Public Companies
The impact of market conditions on pricing of IPO’s, as well as their long term 
performance are also investigated through grouping IPO’s according the year of
issuance.
Table 7; Cumulative Abnormal Returns for IPO’s Grouped According Year of 
Issuance
1 n CAR(1) CAR(5) CAR(250) CAR(500) CAR(750)
1990
( t-stat)
17 3.63%
1.96
6.63%
2.10
(7.39%)
(0.37)
(10.48%)
(0.39)
0.98%
0.03
1991 14 31.59% 31.45% 69.72% 79.86% 88.21%
( t-stat) 1.65 1.61 2.39 2.19 1.94
1992 8 5.14% 11.90% (11.48%) 55.52% 10.36%
( t-stat) 2.88 2.33 (0.49) 1.40 0.20
1993 9 6.45% 27.34% 57.01% 67.41% 77.68%
( t-stat) 4.00 6.06 2.26 2.06 2.01
1994*
( t-stat)
19 5.22%
2.41
(0.75%)
(0.2)
(19.04%)
(1.13)
(20.56%)
(0.88)
1995** 20 10.21% 13.24% 11.01% (2.94%)
( t-stat) 3.03 2.58 0.73 (0.15)
*: computed for up to 500 trading days due to limited availability of follov/ up data.
**: computed for up to 450 trading days due to limited availability of follow up data.
The smallest first day abnormal return belongs to the IPO’s in 1990. The first day 
abnormal return of IPO’s in 1990 is on the average 3.6% with a t-stat of 1.96. The 
highest abnormal return belongs to the IPO’s in 1991 with an abnormal return of
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31.6% and a t-stat of 1.65 though the result is not statistically significant. 
Furthermore, the first day abnormal returns of the samples during the 1992-1995 
period are all statistically significant. Considering abnormal returns on the first day 
after issue it can be concluded that the IPO’s in ISE during 1990-1995 except 1991 
are underpriced as shown in Table 7 .
Figure 4: CAR for IPO's Grouped According to the Year of Issuance
Furthermore, we analyzed long term performance of IPO’s by computing cumulative 
abnormal returns for up to 500 and/or 750 trading days as shown in Figure 5 and 
Figure 6. The highest cumulative abnormal return for 750 trading days belong to the 
IPO’s in 1991 with a cumulative abnormal return of 88.2% and a t-stat of 1.94 as 
shown in Table 7. The smallest cumulative abnormal return for 750 trading days 
belong to the IPO’s in 1990 with a cumulative abnormal return of 0.9% and a t-stat 
of 0.03 as presented in Table 7.
Figure 5: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for IPO's Grouped 
According to the Year of Issuance
1990 ■1991 -1992 1993
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Though the cumulative abnormal returns of the IPO’s during the 1990-93 period for 
750 trading days are positive as seen in Figure 4, the results except in 1993 are not 
statistically significant as presented in table 8. Hence, the study report that the long 
term performance of IPO’s during the 1990-92 period is not any better or worse than 
the average stock in the market, however, the issues in 1993 have significantly 
outperformed the market as seen in Figure 5.
Figure 6: Cumuiative Abnormal Returns for IPO’s Grouped 
According to the Year of Issuance
-1990 -1994 —  - - — 1995
The smallest cumulative abnormal return for 450 trading days belong to the IPO’s in 
1990 with a cumulative abnormal return of (16.2%) and a t-stat of 0.65 as seen in 
Figure 6.
Though the results are not statistically significant as presented in Table 7, the study 
showed that the issues in 1994 and 1995 have underperformed the market and the 
initial positive returns in the days following the initial offering become negative in the 
months that follow as seen in Figure 6. Hence, as far as the medium and long term 
performance of issues during the 1994-95 period is concerned, it can be concluded 
that a significant abnormal return characteristics of IPO’s is not observed.
IPO’s in ISE 34
The impact of offering methods on pricing of IPO’s, as well as their long term 
performance are also investigated through grouping IPO’s according to the offering 
method including offering through sale of newly issued capital and offering through 
sale of existing shares.
Table 8: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for IPO’s Grouped According to the Type of 
Offering Method
1 Offering Method n CAR(1) CAR(5) CAR(250) CAR(500) CAR(750)
Newly Issued C. 27 9.7% 14.8% 18.9% 10.3% 7.2%
( t-stat) 5.06 4.26 1.31 0.50 0.25
Ex. Shares 57 10.3% 9.9% 10.9% 18.7% 22.6%
( t-stat) 2.11 1.93 1.01 1.26 1.12
The first day return and cumulative abnormal return of IPO’s taking place through 
the sale of the existing shares of the current owners are higher than the returns of 
IPO’s taking place a capital increase as seen in Figure 7 . While the first day returns 
of two methods are significant as presented in Table 8, cumulative abnormal returns 
for 750 trading days are not significant.
Figure 7: CAR for IPO's Grouped According to Offering Method
I Newly Issued C. Ex. Shares
Considering the results of the tests for short and long term price behavior, it can be 
concluded that the new issues for two different offering methods are significantly
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underpriced but in the long term a significant return characteristic of IPO’s based on 
the different type of offering method is not observed.
Figure 8: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for IPO's Grouped 
According to the Type of Offering Method
The impact of the percentage of the shares offered to the public on pricing of IPO’s, 
as well as their long term performance are also investigated through grouping IPO’s 
according to the percentage of the shares offered to the public.
Table 9: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for IPO’s Grouped According to the 
Percentage of the Shares Offered to the Public
1 % of the shares n CAR(1) CAR(5) CAR(250) CAR(500) CAR(750)
>= 15%
( t-stat)
72 11.0%
2.80
12.7%
2.98
13.6%
1.44
10.1%
0.78
16.2%
0.89
< 15% 
( t-stat)
15 7.0%
2.13
10.9%
2.17
20.5%
0.97
44.4%
1.48
36.3%
0.89
Average significant underpricing for 11.0% on the first day for the first group 
reaches a CAR of 16.2% after 750 days as shown in Figure 9. Average significant 
underpricing for 7.0% on the first day for the second group reaches a CAR of 36.3% 
after 750 days as seen in Figure 9. However, as presented Table in 9, the latter 
figures are not statistically significant for both groups.
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Figure 9: CAR For IPO's Grouped According to the Percentage of Shares
Offered to the Pubiic
l>= 15% m<  15%
Hence, the IPO’s in the first group are more underpriced with respect to the new 
issues in the second group. However there is no significant direct relation with the 
long term performance of IPO’s and the percentage of the shares offered to the 
public.
Figure 10: Cumulative Abnormal Returns for IPO's Grouped 
According to the Percentage of the Shares Offered to the Public
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VII. CONCLUSION
The present empirical study insights into underpricing mystery of IPO’s and the 
return characteristic and performance of IPO’s in the Turkish Stock Market in the 
short and long term is examined in this study. We would expect stronger anomalies 
if underpricing and poor performance of IPO’s were signs of market inefficiency. 
Accordingly, the examination of 87 IPO’s during 1990-95 in Turkish market showed 
that, on the average IPO’s are underpriced and investors taking a position in IPO’s 
during the offering date can enjoy short term return relative to the market.
In the longer term the speed of market adjustment to mispricing is further explored 
through calculating CAR measured over 750 trading days. However, the result does 
not exhibit any significant long term anomaly. In conclusion, the long term 
performance of IPO’s are not any better or worse than the average stock in the 
market. The most striking empirical findings in this study is initial underpricing 
phenomenon of new issues in an emerging market as it is in developed markets.
We also investigated the impact of the type of companies on the underpricing of 
new issues through grouping the companies in the sample in terms of private issues 
versus public companies. Initial and long term performance of the IPO’s of state- 
owned companies are better than the IPO’s of private companies due to Public 
Participation’s Administration (PPA) acting as a market maker for stocks in its 
portfolio.
In addition, a comparison of IPO’s in different years reveals that market conditions 
and institutional setting in capital market are significant factors in pricing of IPO’s. 
The present study report that the new issues during the 1990-1995 period except
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1991 are underpriced however, no statistically significant medium and long term 
anomalies found within those groups (except IPO’s in 1993).
The differences in the abnormal returns within those groups provide some support 
for the institutional explanation for IPO anomalies since the institutional setting and 
conditions in the Turkish market is changing rapidly over the years and the settings 
and conditions during the studied time period are quite different from the setting in 
developed markets. Especially, it could be noted that during the 1990-95 period, the 
investment banking process was not very structured and there was the variation in 
investment banking procedures of the IPO’s.
For instance, there was less regulatory discipline regarding the allocation of shares 
among investors in an IPO and IPO’s were generally priced at a discount from 
average market multiples. Until the middle of the 90’s, underwriting risk has been 
increasingly incorporating into IPO pricing so that IPO’s were generally priced at a 
discount. On the other hand, in recent years, especially in 1997, underwriting banks 
and securities houses have been able to ignore underwriting risk in their pricing due 
to the increasing competition among underwriters so that IPO’s were generally 
priced at fair value, leading to weak secondary market performance.
Moreover, a comparison of the offering methods including offering through the sale 
of newly issued capital and offering through sale of existing shares and the impact 
of the percentage of the shares offered to the public on pricing of IPO’s, as well as 
their long term performance were also investigated. Considering the results of the 
tests, it can be concluded that there was no direct relation with the performance of 
IPO’s and the percentage of the shares offered to the public and the offering 
methods.
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Considering the importance of the topic, further studies are needed to identify 
sources of variation in IPO’s. The recommended studies may be the reason of 
underpricing, underwriter price support, underwriter reputation and its impact on the 
pricing.
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APPENDIX
INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS USED IN THE STUDY
IPO’S in ISE 43
COMPANY NAME OFFERING
STRUCTURE
FLOAT
%
AMOUNT SOLD 
Million US$
AMOUNT SOLD 
Thousand TL
FIRST 
TRADING DAY
COMPANY NAME OFFERING
STRUCTURE
FLOAT AMOUNT SOLD AMOUNT SOLD
1\ЛМ1|/\п 1 ICC
PRICE PRICE FIRST
1
О
ADANA ÇİMENTO (А) Sale by Shareholder 91 29,98 110.018.790 73,57 270 000
TRADING DAY
2
о
ADANA ÇİMENTO (В) Sale by Shareholder 48 3,27 12.001.140 8,17 30.000
^  1 / Ч/ 1
21/02/91о
л
MIGROS Sale by Shareholder 42 5,75 21.110.000 2,18 8 000 27/02/914 Т. KALKINMA BANKASI Capital Increase N.A 59,1 198.811.000 0.89 3 000 03 06 19915
о
AFYON ÇİMENTO Sale by Shareholder 49 9,93 ^  36.448.650 7,66 30.000
w w . w w .  1 W w  1
27/03/91о VAKIF LEASING Sale by Shareholder 16 7,85 28.800.000 1,49 6 000
Cm 9 t  \ J \ J i  W 1
24/04/917
о
ESBANK Sale by Shareholder 9 14,71 54.000.000 0,92 4 000
fc“ / w ^ /  w  1
06 03 1991о
г»
PETROL OFİSİ Sale by Shareholder 5 19,62 72.000.000 0,99 4.000 30/05/91У
W г \
TUPRAŞ Sale by Shareholder 3 9,95 36.500.000 0,50 2.000
w  w /  w  w  w  1
30/05/9110 
л  л
TOFAŞ OTO TİCARET Sale by Shareholder 10 8,17 30.000.000 3,46 15.000
y J x J i y J y J I  w  1
01/07911 1  
■<1 о
TOFAÇ TÜRK OTOMOBİL Sale by Shareholder 6 51,77 190.000.000 4,39 19.000
w  1  w  1 w  1
07 01 19911 2  
4 о
VAKIF YATIRIM ORTAKLIĞI |NLA : 90 1,23 4.500.000 0,22 1.000 23/08/911 о
Н İİ
PETROKENT TURİZM Sale through Stock Exchange N.A N.A N.A N.A 1.000 09 10 199114 SÖNMEZ FİLAMENT Sale by Shareholder 15 13,08 48.000.000 Г 1,71 8.000
W 4 / «  I w ·  1
23/09/91
--
COMPANY NAME OFFERING
STRUCTURE
FLOAT
%
AMOUNT SOLD AMOUNT SOLD
nnn Tl
PRICE
1 1СФ
PRICE
Tl
FIRST
1 ALARKO SANAYİ Sale by Shareholder 15 6,01 32.812.500 1,60 8.750
TRADING DAY
2 HÜRRİYET GAZETECİLİK Sale by Shareholder Г 10 6,96 40.560.000 1.34 7.800 25/02/923 GLOBAL MKYO Capital Increase 80 3,08 20.000.000 0,15 1.000 21/04/924 TURCAS PETROLCÜLÜK Sale by Shareholder 15 16,84 115.500.000 1,02 7.000 06.04.19925 MEDYA HOLDİNG Sale by Shareholder 1 81 11,77 80.830.600 0,68 4.700 06.09.19926 TRANSTÜRK HOLDİNG Capital Increase 4 0,43 3.045.475 0,14 1.000 09.08.19927 ÇİMENTAŞ Capital Increase 17 8,26 63.000.000 1,38 10.500 20/10/928 ВЕКО Sale by Shareholder 10 21,81 170.000.000 i 1,09 8.500 26/10/92
COMPANY NAME OFFERING
STRUCTURE
FLOAT
%
AMOUNT SOLD 
US$ Million
AMOUNT SOLD
nnn Tl
PRICE
1 ICC
PRICE
Tl
FIRST
1 EGE SERAMİK Sale by Shareholder 15 6,70 60.750.000 0,74 6.750
1 KAuING  DAY
2 NETAS NORTHERN EL?;Sale by Shareholder 20 22,08 207.900.000 0,88 8.250 15.03.19933 DOGAN ŞİRKETLER GR Sale by Shareholder 15 9,05 101.400.000 0,46 5.200 21.06.19934 RAKS ELEKTRONİK Capital Increase 15 r  7,45 85800000 0,34 3.900 09.08.19935 TAT KONSERVE Capital increase 10 5,86 67.500.000 0,65 7.500 09.08.19936 FINANS LEASING Sale by Shareholder 20 10,31 126.000.000 0,37 4.500 05.10.19937 EMSAN BESYILDIZ Capital Increase 33 3,08 40.664.000 0,49 6.500 08.11.19938 AKSU İPLİK Capital Increase 16 16,86 225.000.000 0,56 7.500 15.11.19939 AKTİF FINANS FACTOR Capital Increase 20 4 ^ 70.000.000İ 0,501 7.000 20.12.1993
COMPANY NAME OFFERING
STRUCTURE
FLOAT AMOUNT SOLD 
% US$ Million
us$ AMOUNT SOLD  
000 TL
PRICE
US$
PRICE
TL
FIRST 
TRADING DAY
1 MILPA TIC. Sale by Shareholder 15 13,71 17.723 243.000.000 2,54 45.000 15.02.1994
2 YAPI KREDİ LEASING Sale by Shareholder 15 9,86 18.260 180.000.000 0,33 6.000 28.02.1994
3 IHLAS HOLDİNG Capital Increase 18 34,83 20.160 702.100.000 2,48 50.000 16.03.1994
4 SABAH PAZARLAMA Sale by Shareholder 39 6,25 21.553 134.750.000 0,65 14.000 23.03.1994
5 ÇUMRA KAĞIT Capital Increase 9 1,91 30.982 59.200.000 0,52 16.000 20.06.1994
6 KEREVİTAŞ Capital Increase 29 6,20 30.982 192.000.000 0,77 24.000 20.06.1994
7 DARDANEL ÖNENTAŞ Capital Increase 38 24,96 31.245 780.000.000 2,08 65.000 22.08.1994
8 BUGÜN YAYINCILIK A.Ş Sale by Shareholder 20 2,65 33.926 90.000.000 0,13 4.500 01.09.1994
9 MUTLU AKÜ Sale by Shareholder 15 15,00 33.757 506.250.000 1,33 45.000 12.09.1994
10 BORUSAN Sale by Shareholder 20 20,44 33.757 690.000.000 0,68 23.000 12.09.1994
11 MERKO Sale by Shareholder 15 5,11 35.217 180.000.000 0,14 5.000 20.10.1994
12 VİKİNG Sale by Shareholder 32 7,16 35.201 252.000.000 0,57 20.000 24.10.1994
13 ANADOLÜ Sale by Shareholder 26 11,11 36.468 405000000 0,12 4.500 28.11.1994
14 GÜNEŞ SİGORTA A.Ş. Sale by Shareholder 15 8,74 36.468 318.750.000 0,47 17.000 28.11.1994
15 TÜKAŞ Sale by Shareholder 15 8,34 36.545 304.762.500 0,59 21.500 05.12.1994
16 AKSİGORTA A.Ş. Sale by Shareholder 15 18,47 36.545 675.000.000 0,25 9.000 05.12.1994
17 RAKS ELEKTRİKLİ EV Capital Increase 30 6,56 37.715 247.500.000 0,44 16.500 19.12.1994
18 SÖNMEZ PAMUKLU Sale by Shareholder 20 15,26 38.019 580.000.000 0,11 4.000 26.12.1994
19 ÇEMTAŞ Sale by Shareholder 20 3,72 38.418 142.761.000 0,35 13.500 30.12.1994
COMPANY NAME OFFERING
STRUCTURE
FLOAT
%
AMOUNT SOLD 
USS
AMOUNT SOLD 
000 TL
PRICE PRICE
Tl
FIRST
TPAHIM r' r»AV
1 RANT FİNANSAL Capital Increase 25 1.70 70.000.000 0,07 2.800 20.02.19952 GÖLTAŞ GÖLLER . Capital Increase 13 6,09 252.000.000 0,18 7.500 06.03.19953 'e v r e n  m e n k u l Capital Increase 96 5.77 240.000.000 0,02 1.000 14.03.19954 BATIÇİM BATI ANADOLl[capital Increase 8 9,98 416.000.000 0,29 12.000 20.03.19955 SÖKTAŞ PAMUK VE TAİCapital Increase 16 4,49 187.500.000 0,36 15.000 03.04.19956 ERBOSAN ERCİYAS 1 Capital Increase 12 2,60 110.125.000 0,13 5.500 17.04.19957 OTOKAR OTOBÜS 1Sale by Shareholder 20 9,57 408.000.000 0,60 25.500 24.04.19958 FRİGO-PAK Capital Increase 28 4,09 174.375.000 0,36 15.500 24.04.19959 ÇBS BOYA Capital Increase 30 6,27 263.840.000 0,16 6.800 15.05.199510 BOROVA Sale by Shareholder 15 0,35 15.000.000 0,44 18.500 01.05.199511 ARDEM Sale by Shareholder 15 14,36 612.000.000 0,40 17.000 29.05.199512 BUMERANG YATIRIM Sale through Stock E 90 0,26 11.250.000 0,02 1.000 29.05.199513 ESEM SPOR GİYİM Capital Increase 16 11,24 480.000.000 0,26 11.000 05.06.199514 COMMERCIAL UNION Sale by Shareholder 15 7,19 309.375.000 0,32 13.750 20.06.199515 ECZACIBAŞI YAPI Sale by Shareholder 30 44,93 1.950.000.000 0,15 6.500 26.06.199516 TÜMTEKS TEKSTİL Capital Increase 32 9,27 402.500.000 0,26 11.500 26.06.199517 NERGİS HOLDİNG A.Ş. Capital Increase 17 19,35 840.000.000 0,16 7.000 26.06.199518 ALTERNATİFBANK Sale by Shareholder 20 14,38 630.000.000 0,08 3.500 03.07.199519 BOSSA Sale by Shareholder 15 25,68 1.215.000.000 0,10 4.500 21.08.199520 KAPLAMİN Capital Increase 17 6.00 287.500.000 0,24 11.500 04.09.1995
